When Italy, Japan and the United Kingdom unveiled the Global Combat Air Program in 2022, most attention focused on the aircraft itself. Three years later, however, it has become clear that the program is about far more than replacing today’s fighters. For Rome, it has become first and foremost an industrial project aimed at preserving national capabilities in aircraft design, systems integration and advanced manufacturing within one of the world’s most demanding defense sectors.
Recent developments throughout 2026 have reinforced this perception. New financial commitments, the establishment of a common industrial governance structure and discussions about accelerating the program’s timeline all point to a broader strategic ambition extending well beyond military capability alone.
This evolution comes at a time when several major European defense programs are entering a phase in which governance models and industrial workshare will shape technological competitiveness for decades to come. For Italy, the challenge is therefore no longer limited to fielding a highly capable future combat aircraft. It is about maintaining a position among the small group of nations capable of designing and integrating some of the world’s most sophisticated military aerospace systems.
The key questions are straightforward: why is Rome investing so heavily in the program, what industrial benefits does it expect to secure, and which uncertainties could still reshape those ambitions?
An investment driven primarily by industrial sovereignty
The Italian Parliament’s decision in early 2026 marked a major milestone. Lawmakers approved €8.77 billion to finance the program’s initial national phases through 2037. The decision confirms that the Global Combat Air Program has become one of Italy’s largest long-term defense industrial investments. According to Reuters, total Italian spending could ultimately reach approximately €18.6 billion, substantially above the financial assumptions made when the program was first announced.
Such figures could easily be interpreted as evidence of escalating costs. That would, however, overlook the nature of large aerospace development programs. As operational requirements mature, engineering activities expand and industrial infrastructure is established, financial estimates naturally evolve. The program extends far beyond the production of an aircraft. It encompasses mission systems, advanced sensors, secure communications, software, digital engineering environments and the ability to modernize the platform throughout its operational life.
For Italy, the investment therefore reflects industrial policy as much as defense procurement.
For decades, Leonardo has remained one of the few European companies capable of operating across the entire aerospace value chain, from research and development to the integration of highly complex systems. These capabilities represent strategic assets that would be extremely difficult to rebuild if lost. Italian policymakers therefore see participation from the earliest stages of development as essential to preserving engineering expertise extending well beyond the immediate needs of the country’s armed forces.
Leonardo’s own strategic communication reflects this approach. Rather than presenting the program solely as the development of a future combat aircraft, the company describes it as a catalyst for digital engineering, advanced electronics, sensing technologies, software architectures and systems integration capabilities likely to benefit other industrial sectors over the coming decades.
From this perspective, the program’s value lies not only in the aircraft itself, but also in the technological expertise accumulated throughout its development.
Leonardo’s evolving role within the program
Traditionally, multinational aerospace programs divide responsibilities among specialized suppliers. One company develops the radar, another the engine, another the airframe, while relatively few organizations retain visibility across the overall system architecture.
The Global Combat Air Program follows a different model.
Leonardo participates directly in the common industrial governance alongside BAE Systems and Japan Aircraft Industrial Enhancement through Edgewing, the joint company established to lead the program’s development activities. This structure places the three industrial partners in comparable positions when defining the program’s major technological and industrial decisions.
For Italy, this fundamentally changes the position of its aerospace industry within the program. Systems integration has become one of the rarest competencies in modern military aviation. Designing a highly capable airframe remains a major engineering challenge, but integrating sensors, software, communications, data processing, collaborative systems and future software upgrades increasingly determines the operational effectiveness of a combat aircraft.
By occupying a central role in this architecture, Leonardo aims to preserve its ability to act as a systems integrator rather than simply supplying individual subsystems. That distinction is strategically significant because integration expertise is considerably more difficult to acquire than manufacturing specialized equipment.
The program also places strong emphasis on digital engineering, virtual design environments, open architectures and development methods intended to shorten engineering cycles. Beyond the future aircraft itself, these technologies represent a strategic investment for Italy’s wider industrial base regardless of the program’s eventual commercial success.
Maintaining a complex industrial ecosystem for decades
Italy’s contribution extends well beyond Leonardo. Companies such as Avio Aero, whose expertise lies in propulsion technologies, ELT Group, a specialist in electronic warfare, and MBDA Italia, a major missile systems manufacturer, all possess capabilities that could contribute directly or indirectly to the program. They are supported by a dense network of highly specialized small and medium-sized enterprises spanning advanced materials, precision manufacturing, software development, electronics and systems engineering.
Italian universities and research centers also form an essential part of this ecosystem. Already active in areas such as advanced materials, artificial intelligence, autonomous systems and digital engineering, they provide the scientific and engineering expertise needed to sustain future aerospace programs. Preserving this industrial and academic base is as important as maintaining the engineering skills required to develop future combat aircraft.
Each successive development phase has the potential to generate research, engineering and production contracts throughout this supply chain.
The broader objective is therefore to preserve highly specialized competencies that often require decades to develop. Once these skills disappear, rebuilding them becomes exceptionally difficult, reducing a country’s ability to participate in future European or international aerospace programs.
This aspect is often overshadowed by discussions surrounding the aircraft itself. Yet, in economic terms, it arguably represents the strongest justification for Italy’s long-term commitment to the program.
Avoiding the pitfalls of multinational programs
One of the program’s most significant developments during 2025 and 2026 has been the establishment of Edgewing, the joint company responsible for leading the design and development of the Global Combat Air Program. Equally owned by Leonardo, BAE Systems and Japan Aircraft Industrial Enhancement, the company forms the cornerstone of the program’s new industrial governance.
For Italy, this organizational model offers several important advantages.
The first is the principle of equality among the three founding industrial partners. Unlike some multinational programs where one prime contractor dominates decision-making before allocating work among its partners, Edgewing is built around a genuinely trilateral governance structure in which each nation participates in defining the program’s major strategic decisions.
A second advantage concerns industrial visibility. Being involved in the organization responsible for designing the overall system architecture provides considerably greater influence than acting solely as a supplier of individual subsystems.
Finally, the common structure should encourage earlier exchanges of expertise between British, Italian and Japanese engineering teams, reducing duplicated effort while accelerating technical decision-making.
However, this governance model should not be misunderstood. Equal ownership of a joint company does not automatically guarantee an equal share of industrial value.
Holding one-third of the company’s capital does not necessarily mean receiving one-third of the engineering work, one-third of production activities or one-third of the program’s long-term revenues.
Industrial responsibilities will continue to evolve throughout the program according to technological expertise, industrial performance and decisions jointly taken by the three partners.
In other words, institutional equality does not automatically translate into economic equality. This distinction may ultimately determine whether the program delivers the industrial benefits that Rome expects.
The four indicators that will measure Italy’s success
One of the most common mistakes when assessing major aerospace programs is to judge success solely by the number of aircraft eventually produced.
From an Italian perspective, four other indicators are likely to prove far more important.
• Mastering critical technologies: Mission software, digital architectures, advanced data processing, multi-function sensors, secure communications and electronic warfare technologies will account for an increasing share of the system’s overall value. Maintaining national expertise in these fields will also benefit future civilian and military programs beyond the Global Combat Air Program itself.
• Preserving long-term design capabilities: Unlike conventional industrial products, combat aircraft continue evolving throughout their operational lives. New software, sensors, weapons and mission capabilities are integrated continuously over several decades. Countries that remain involved in these upgrades retain engineering expertise that is significantly more valuable than simply manufacturing individual components.
• Securing export opportunities: Should the program achieve international commercial success, long-term revenues generated through in-service support, upgrades and future capability enhancements could ultimately exceed the value of the initial production contracts. For Italy, participation in the global support market may prove just as important as participation in aircraft manufacturing itself.
• Strengthening the national industrial base: Industrial benefits will only prove sustainable if they extend beyond the country’s largest defense companies. The program’s long-term success will therefore depend on the ability of small and medium-sized enterprises to participate in developing future technologies alongside Italy’s major industrial groups.
Could a faster development timeline change the equation?
Among the program’s most closely watched developments are recent comments by Leonardo former Chief Executive Roberto Cingolani, who suggested that entry into service could potentially be brought forward by as much as two years, provided that the initial operational configuration accepted a lower level of maturity than originally envisaged.
Such remarks should be interpreted with caution. They do not represent a new official program schedule. The governments involved continue to target operational service around 2035. Nevertheless, the comments reveal an interesting evolution in industrial thinking.
Rather than attempting to deliver every planned capability from the outset, Leonardo argues that an incremental approach could allow an initial operational capability to enter service earlier while introducing more advanced functions progressively over time.
This philosophy has already been adopted by several major aerospace programs. From Italy’s perspective, such an approach offers several potential advantages. It could reduce the risk of losing critical engineering expertise between current programs and the future combat system while accelerating the ramp-up of Italian industrial production.
Earlier availability could also strengthen the program’s competitiveness in an increasingly crowded international market. The strategy nevertheless carries significant risks.
Accelerating such an ambitious program would require exceptionally disciplined program management, stable operational requirements and close cooperation among all three partner nations. Any major change in requirements or divergence in national priorities could quickly erode the anticipated schedule gains.
Could new partners change Italy’s position?
Another issue that has moved to the center of the debate is the possible enlargement of the program.
Several countries have expressed varying degrees of interest in joining or establishing closer ties with the initiative. From Italy’s perspective, this prospect offers clear opportunities.
The accession of an additional partner could increase the program’s financial resources, broaden future export prospects and further enhance its international credibility. Higher production volumes could also contribute to lowering unit costs throughout the program’s life cycle. However, enlargement would inevitably come with trade-offs.
Any new participant would expect an industrial role commensurate with its financial contribution. That expectation would almost certainly require a renegotiation of industrial workshare and governance arrangements. Today, the program rests on a relatively balanced structure involving three partners of broadly comparable industrial weight. Introducing a fourth nation would inevitably alter that equilibrium.
For Italy, the challenge will therefore be to reconcile two objectives that are not always fully compatible: strengthening the program through additional investment while preserving the industrial responsibilities and technological influence secured since its inception. This balance is likely to become one of the program’s defining political and industrial questions over the coming years.
Ultimately, the Global Combat Air Program should not be viewed solely as a defense procurement initiative. From an Italian perspective, it represents a long-term industrial policy designed to preserve the country’s ability to develop, integrate and continuously modernize advanced military aerospace systems.
If the program achieves its stated objectives, Italy could reinforce its position within the small group of nations capable of contributing to the complete design of a next-generation combat air system. Such a position would strengthen not only its defense industrial base but also its technological competitiveness across a range of high-value sectors.
Conversely, significant changes to the industrial governance model, delays, rising costs or a redistribution of technological responsibilities could reduce many of the expected benefits.
The program’s success will therefore not be measured solely by the performance of the future aircraft.
It will depend on whether Italy succeeds in preserving the engineering capabilities, industrial know-how and technological leadership required to remain one of the few countries able to design complex combat air systems over the coming decades.
In that respect, the most important investment may not be the aircraft itself, but the industrial ecosystem that will make future generations of aerospace systems possible.
