When Western countries launched a rapid rearmament effort following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, attention naturally focused on defense budgets, ammunition orders, and production capacity. Yet another constraint quickly emerged: the availability of certain materials essential to manufacturing modern military equipment.
In our previous article, we explored why critical materials are becoming a new measure of military power. This analysis examines how they shape the production of modern weapons systems.
This reality extends far beyond mining alone. In the defense sector, the challenge is not simply having access to a mineral deposit or a supplier. It is about mastering the entire industrial chain that transforms a raw material into a component suitable for use in a radar, an electronic warfare system, a missile, or a satellite.
According to the International Energy Agency, global refining and processing capacity for critical materials remains highly concentrated across several strategic segments, creating growing vulnerabilities for Western defense industries.
Against the backdrop of renewed strategic competition among major powers, this dependence has gradually become a national security issue.
A constraint less visible than defense budgets
Since 2022, European and North American governments have announced significant reinvestment in their military capabilities. Orders for missiles, air defense systems, precision-guided munitions, and advanced sensors have increased sharply.
Yet defense manufacturers are discovering that assembly capacity is only part of the challenge.
Producing a modern weapons system requires thousands of components incorporating specialized materials. When just one of those materials becomes difficult to obtain, the entire production chain can be disrupted.
This represents a major shift. For decades, industrial globalization allowed Western manufacturers to rely on supply chains optimized for cost and availability. The return of geopolitical tensions is now challenging that model.
The question is no longer simply how many systems governments can afford to buy. It is also how many can actually be produced when demand rises rapidly.
An industrial dependency concentrated in processing
One of the most common misconceptions is to reduce the debate to mining activities.
In reality, the greatest vulnerabilities often lie in the intermediate stages: refining, purification, chemical separation, and industrial processing.
The European Commission itself emphasizes that the most critical dependencies frequently concern processing and transformation capabilities rather than access to raw resources.
This distinction is fundamental.
A raw material may be extracted in one country, shipped to a second for refining, processed in a third, and finally integrated into a military component assembled somewhere else.
An example of dependency: Gallium
Gallium is one of the clearest examples of this evolving challenge.
The material is used in advanced gallium nitride (GaN) semiconductors. These components are incorporated into several generations of electronically scanned radars, electronic warfare systems, and high-performance communications equipment.
The operational advantages are significant. These technologies increase transmission power, improve energy efficiency, and enhance the overall performance of detection systems.
The issue took on a new strategic dimension when China imposed export restrictions on gallium in July 2023, officially citing national security considerations.
For Western defense manufacturers, however, the decision primarily highlighted the concentration of critical technology supply chains.
The issue extended well beyond gallium itself. It exposed the broader dependence of high-technology industries on processing capabilities that remain heavily concentrated in a limited number of countries.
Permanent magnets: an overlooked dependency
Rare earth elements provide another particularly important example for the defense sector.
Contrary to a common misconception, their role extends far beyond electric vehicles and energy technologies.
Certain rare earth elements are used to manufacture high-performance permanent magnets found in electric motors, actuators, guidance systems, sensors, and numerous onboard electronic systems.
These components are integrated into a wide range of modern military platforms.
The U.S. Department of Defense considers this dependency critical enough to justify the development of a complete industrial supply chain, from material processing to the production of permanent magnets for defense applications.
This decision reflects a growing concern: the ability to produce certain military systems may depend more on an often-overlooked industrial component than on advanced technology itself.
China also remains the world’s leading producer of rare earth permanent magnets, reinforcing the strategic importance of securing alternative supply chains.
A vulnerability affecting both the United States and Europe
Dependence on critical materials is not exclusively a European challenge. Despite possessing one of the world’s largest defense industrial bases, the United States faces similar vulnerabilities across several strategic sectors.
Today, the U.S. Department of Defense considers critical materials to be directly linked to military readiness, industrial capacity, and national resilience during major crises. American officials emphasize that these materials are found in virtually every major defense system, including fighter aircraft, submarines, satellites, and missile systems.
Europe faces an additional challenge. In several sectors, its industrial processing capabilities remain more limited than those of the United States. As a result, European institutions increasingly view critical raw materials as a matter of industrial sovereignty affecting defense, space, and advanced technologies alike.
The result is paradoxical. Western industries possess some of the world’s most advanced military technologies while remaining dependent on external value chains for certain materials essential to their production.
This reality affects not only future weapons programs but also equipment already in service. The vulnerability therefore extends beyond next-generation capabilities it also impacts the long-term ability to sustain and maintain existing military fleets.
China’s export restrictions: the reality of industrial leverage
For years, discussions surrounding critical materials remained largely theoretical. The measures introduced by Beijing over the past several years have made the issue far more tangible.
Following export controls on gallium and germanium announced in 2023, Chinese authorities introduced additional restrictions in April 2025 covering several medium and heavy rare earth elements as well as a range of related products.
These measures immediately drew the attention of Western defense manufacturers.
The issue extends beyond the immediate availability of materials. It also concerns the predictability of supply chains. A defense industry cannot rapidly expand production if it lacks confidence in future access to critical components.
Recent analyses suggest that China’s restrictions on rare earth elements and permanent magnets could have significant consequences for multiple industrial supply chains supporting the U.S. defense sector.
For Western governments, the question is therefore no longer whether this dependency exists. The challenge is how to reduce it before a more severe crisis disrupts industrial production.
What this dependency means for armed forces
The importance of critical materials becomes fully apparent when considering the duration of modern conflicts.
The performance of a weapons system remains essential. However, in a prolonged war, the ability to replace losses, repair damaged equipment, and sustain production can become just as decisive.
The war in Ukraine has brought this reality back to the forefront.
Western countries have discovered that certain categories of ammunition and missiles can be consumed far more rapidly than previously anticipated. In such an environment, the central question is no longer simply how many systems are available today, but how many can be produced tomorrow.
This marks the return of industrial capacity as a core element of strategic thinking.
For several decades, military power was primarily measured by the number of platforms in service and their technical performance. Today, supply chain resilience and industrial production capacity are once again becoming key indicators of military strength.
For decades, military power was primarily assessed through the lens of platforms, defense budgets, and force size.
Current tensions surrounding critical materials demonstrate that another dimension has become equally essential: the ability to sustain production over time.
The United States, Europe, and their allies continue to hold a significant technological advantage across many areas of defense. That advantage, however, depends on industrial supply chains whose most critical links remain heavily concentrated in China.
The challenge is therefore not simply to field the most advanced weapons systems. It is also to secure reliable access to the materials, industrial processes, and technical expertise required to manufacture them, sustain them in service, and replace them as operational demands increase.
In an era of long-term strategic competition, industrial resilience is gradually becoming a core component of military power. It is no longer merely an economic issue it has become a strategic capability in its own right.
