In March 2026, during the large-scale ORION 2026 exercise, French forces tested an experimental structure designed to build situational awareness, analyze activity, and plan operations across the electromagnetic spectrum at the joint command level.
The tool used during the exercise fused data from sensors and other sources to build a common picture of the electromagnetic spectrum and help coordinate the capabilities involved.
The experiment points to a broader shift in modern warfare: cyber operations, signals intelligence, electronic warfare, drones, and communications are becoming increasingly interconnected on the battlefield. The United Kingdom, for example, considers cyber and electromagnetic capabilities essential to targeting and sees a need for closer coordination between them. Yet current conflicts also reveal a paradox: integrating these capabilities does not automatically translate into operational effectiveness or lasting advantage.
Cyber and electronic warfare are beginning to converge
European militaries are approaching this convergence in different ways.
France is focusing primarily on command and control. ORION 2026 tested the synchronization of effects across the electromagnetic spectrum with physical operations.
The Netherlands is taking a more capability-focused approach. On June 11, 2026, the Dutch Ministry of Defense announced the acquisition of new systems capable of disrupting, neutralizing, or deceiving adversary radio communications. These systems are also expected to contribute to tactical cyber operations against enemy communications and information systems.
The United Kingdom is pushing integration at the institutional level. Its 2025 Strategic Defence Review called for the creation of a Cyber and Electromagnetic Command responsible for coordinating military activities across cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum. The British Ministry of Defence subsequently announced the command’s establishment, alongside the development of a digital network intended to better connect sensors, decision-makers, and weapons.
Across these different approaches, the objective is broadly the same: shorten the sensor-to-decision-to-effect chain. Ukraine shows why that goal remains difficult to achieve in practice.
Ukraine: electromagnetic superiority remains temporary
The war in Ukraine has demonstrated the growing importance of detecting electromagnetic emissions, disrupting communications and navigation, and coordinating these activities with physical effects. A study published in 2025 identified improved synchronization between cyber, electromagnetic, and physical effects as one of the key challenges highlighted by the conflict.
But effective electromagnetic defenses inevitably drive counter-adaptation. Russia now employs fiber-optic-controlled drones whose command links do not depend on radio signals that can be jammed. In 2026, such systems were notably used against Ukrainian electrical substations protected by counter-drone defenses.
This dynamic helps explain why spectrum dominance remains difficult to convert into a lasting operational advantage. Jamming, frequency changes, new communications links, greater autonomy, and fiber-optic control are driving a continuous cycle of measures and countermeasures. Analyses of the conflict therefore emphasize the importance of adaptable and resilient capabilities rather than fixed technical solutions.
An additional challenge emerges when multiple friendly systems must operate simultaneously within the same electromagnetic environment. Communications systems, drones, radars, and jammers all compete for access to that environment, creating potential conflicts between their respective requirements. Coordination therefore becomes as important as the power of the jamming system itself.
The relevant question is no longer simply whether a jammer works.
From Taiwan to the middle east, resilience becomes the central challenge
Taiwan is exploring a different response: preserving command and control when communications and the electromagnetic environment are degraded. In preparation for the 2026 Han Kuang 42 exercise, Taiwan’s armed forces planned dispersed command posts, backup mechanisms, and decentralized execution of orders. These arrangements were intended to be tested in a complex electromagnetic environment that included communications disruptions.
In August 2026, the exercises also tested commanders’ ability to respond to unexpected adversary actions while deliberately degrading some civilian communications to make the scenario more realistic. The lesson goes beyond fielding a more powerful jammer: resilience may depend less on preventing disruption than on maintaining command and control through it.
On NATO’s eastern flank, the problem increasingly extends beyond the battlefield. In spring 2026, Finland’s communications authority reported an increase in disruptions affecting satellite navigation and mobile networks, particularly near the country’s eastern border, and said the interference originated from Russian territory. Lithuania, meanwhile, says systems deployed in Kaliningrad can spoof navigation signals at ranges of up to 450 kilometers. Moscow rejects these allegations.
NATO and Finland also tested a system in July designed to detect, classify, and locate this type of interference from maritime and airborne platforms.
In the Middle East, the same convergence is playing out differently. An analysis published in August 2026 reported that Iranian actors had compromised telecommunications networks in an effort to locate U.S. military personnel and had exploited connected cameras to support targeting or battle damage assessment. Concerns over location-data exploitation have become serious enough that the U.S. military disabled certain advertising identifiers on personnel devices following reports that such data could potentially be used to target forces in the Middle East.
The real challenge: coordinating without becoming dependent
The convergence of cyber and electronic warfare requires a sufficiently clear operational picture for commanders to make timely decisions, coordination mechanisms capable of preventing friendly systems from interfering with one another, and fallback solutions when networks become unavailable.
It also requires personnel capable of interpreting a technical environment that changes rapidly. The United Kingdom has acknowledged that bringing cyber and electromagnetic warfare closer together creates recruitment and training challenges, leading it to develop specialized career paths and make greater use of civilian expertise. The Netherlands, for its part, has emphasized the value of joint European procurement to improve the interoperability of capabilities that remain relatively scarce across Europe.
Three criteria stand out when assessing this convergence: the speed of adaptation, the ability to prevent friendly interference, and resilience when communications or navigation are degraded.
The most consequential advances may ultimately be less visible than the arrival of a new jammer. They include automated spectrum management, communications capable of operating under jamming, operator training, and the ability of different systems to rapidly exchange information.
