As geopolitical tensions rise in the Baltic Sea, Sweden is accelerating the modernization of its maritime surveillance architecture, blending national initiatives, a stronger Coast Guard, and NATO integration, to secure a vital yet vulnerable domain. In 2025, a string of subsea incidents affecting data and energy cables helped trigger Baltic Sentry, NATO’s vigilance activity focused on protecting critical underwater infrastructure (CUI).
A maritime wake-up
Sweden’s accession to NATO on March 7, 2024, reset its defense priorities. Long focused on territorial defense and airpower, Stockholm now places maritime security at the heart of its Totalförsvar (total defense) strategy. The Baltic Sea, an essential corridor for trade, energy and subsea infrastructure, is both a strategic asset and a point of fragility. In response, Sweden has offered up to three combatants, one ASC 890 surveillance aircraft, and Coast Guard assets (four vessels plus seven held in reserve) to support Baltic Sentry.
Expanded mandate for the coast guard
The government has submitted a bill to the Riksdag (Prop. 2025/26:36) that would give the Kustbevakningen a larger role in maritime monitoring and intelligence, creating a true civil hub for the sjölägesbild (maritime common operating picture) and setting rules for analytical data processing. Target effective date: March 1, 2026, pending adoption.
The aim is to aggregate and disseminate a shared picture, fused from naval, air, and civil sensors, to detect anomalies, hybrid activity, or illicit operations faster, in structured cooperation with the Försvarsmakten (Armed Forces). This shift recasts the Coast Guard, traditionally centered on law enforcement and environmental protection, as a cornerstone of Sweden’s maritime resilience.
Capability debate: In 2025 the government also floated the arming of selected Coast Guard units—an issue still under discussion.
Tackling the “Shadow Fleet”
Since July 1, 2025, new rules require foreign-flagged ships to provide verified information on insurance and ownership. The measure applies not only to port calls but also to vessels transiting Swedish territorial waters and the EEZ, an explicit legal tool against shadow-fleet practices.
Technology, airpower, and NATO integration
- Air–maritime surveillance : In 2025, Sweden committed an ASC 890 to Baltic Sentry for surveillance over the Baltic, while proceeding with the transfer of two aircraft to Ukraine. By spring 2025, Ukraine reported test and familiarization flights, with operational integration advancing through the year.
- Modernized coastal network : Sweden’s coastal radar coverage stepped up a tier: 51 SCANTER 5202 radars were delivered to the Defence Materiel Administration (FMV), improving detection of small surface targets and low-altitude air tracks and feeding the shared maritime picture.
- Next-generation surface combatants (YSF 2030 / Luleå class) : The Navy plans four “heavy” multi-role units (ASuW/AAW/ASW/ISR), with initial service entry from 2030 (2025-confirmed planning) and full delivery targeted by 2035. Saab (Kockums) leads the design phase in collaboration with Babcock, while preserving industrial options given the ambitious schedule.
- Bridging capability : The Visby class will field the Sea Ceptor (MBDA) from 2026, strengthening local AAW while the Luleå class comes online.
Toward an integrated baltic watch
Taken together, these moves mark an inflection point: Sweden is no longer a bystander in the Baltic but a central actor in collective vigilance. Its integrated model, civil, military, allied, embodies Totalförsvar: cooperation, redundancy, and societal preparedness. The ramp-up directly answers repeated cable incidents in 2025 and NATO’s coordinated response across the Baltic.
